MURRAY AND HIS RECENT CRITICS
Both his dissertation on Scheeben and The Problem of God figure in a recent article on the theological sources for Murray's ethics. 11 J. Leon Hooper reads the texts as evidence that Murray formulated his ethical principles within the moral universe of Roman Catholicism, not on a natural-law basis outside time, faith, and community. Murray's ethics presupposed and implied the unified whole of the content of faith carried by Catholic tradition. Hooper's approach indicates the primacy of faith as the horizon within which Murray argued philosophical, historical, and jurisprudential as well as theological principles. Hooper's support of a strong rather than weak contribution from faith in his ethics encourages further inquiry into Murray's theological positions. Another interpretation of Murray, however, renders the inquiry futile. Some, whose criticisms echo opposition to Murray in the 1950s, 12 seek to discredit his contribution and to nullify its influence. 13 In their view his entire vision consisted in a theologically fatal compromise which tailored Catholic faith to the contours of an American status quo. Understandably disturbed by signs that Catholics have overadjusted to American culture, 14 they pin the blame on Murray as the most guilty sponsor of American Catholicism's decline into a comfortable but spiritually flaccid accommodation to modern, especially American, Uberai ideology.
For Michael Schuck, this means Murray adopted a liberal model of the self in society. According to William Gould, Murray's political philosophy imbibed too much liberal political culture. David L. Schindler argues that Murray grounded his argument for religious liberty in "nature's primitive 'indifference' toward God." 16 According to Schindler, Murray's sharp distinction between nature and grace views nature, freedom, and the state as first of all in a condition of neutrality or indifference to God and religious truth. Schindler thinks that Murray's affirmation that government is incompetent (Murray did not say "indifferent") 17 in matters of religion presupposes a concept of nature related to God through grace alone, as if it were not dependent because of creation. He supposes that Murray, on that basis, constructed a natural, autonomous freedom disconnected from the reality and knowledge of God. Consequently, "for Murray, it is (logically) possible for the meaning of freedom to be engaged without implicating the question of God's truth."
18 Either this interpretation of Murray's concept of nature and truth is correct or Murray adheres to Aquinas's natural-law principles: that actually existing created natures depend on God for existence and operation as well as tend toward God; and that natural law is the rational creature's participation in God's eternal law. But Murray's Thomist natural-law theory is plain to see and has often been remarked on. So Schindler's reading is incorrect. It reads Murray out of the task of actualizing a postconciliar, American Catholic communion ecclesiology, when in fact his work could be among resources for it.
The charge that Murray colluded with liberal ideology calls for some response. It is clear that Murray endorsed political institutions which he forthrightly attributed to a broad, liberal, Western Christian tradition of church-and-state dualism, of law as reasonable, and of the rule of law as the basic activity of the state. This liberal tradition engendered the gradual realization, through suffering, that religious liberty belongs to human dignity. But did this plunge Murray into 19th-and His singular abilities and public prominence did nothing to diminish the reality of participation in a common life and mission.
For example, he owned no private property. He earned no personal income, amassed no nest-egg for bequeathal to heirs, and received what resources he used from goods held in common. He took up professional tasks of teaching, writing, editing, delivering public addresses, participating in the debates of American public life, not to mention liturgical and spiritual ministries, under a vow of obedience. He multiplied relationships of service and friendship on the basis of something other than a strategy for advancing self-interest. His labors contributed to and were part of the common good of the Catholic Church and of American society. His free self-disposition within a vow of obedience meant that his self-direction never ruled out readiness to heed the counsel and authority of superiors in his congregation or the Church.
22 It could and did bring self-sacrifice, understood as a mode of fidelity to Christ. This was evident when he bore an official silencing in 1954. 23 Murray's obedience did not exemplify utilitarian or expressive individualism. Consequently, there is no plausible way to construe Murray's 47 years as a member of a religious congregation as an exercise in American individualism.
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Rather, the inner form of his life-practice was imitatio Christi, an apostolic discipleship with a clear ecclesial dimension. 
eralism" (1937)
27 and "liberalist individualism" (I960) 28 is evident and undeniable. The better-known 1960 position will be noted here.
We Hold These Truths took issue with Locke on the origin of the state out of an allegedly original, asocial, apolitical condition of human existence. 29 Murray objected that an inherently presocial self inhabiting a prepoliticai state of nature was a figment of philosophical imagination nowhere to be found in fact. He characterized this view of the person as follows: "In the state of nature, man appears with complete suddenness as a full-grown individual, a hard little atom in the midst of atoms equally hard, all solitary and self-enclosed, each a sociological monad." 30 Locke's postulate of a "state of nature" of this sort, and his theory of the origin of the state in a contract aimed at protection of the life and private property of individualist contractées, Murray thought, corroded rather than sponsored or supported American democracy. So he pointed out the social aspect of the human rights protected but not invented by the Bill of Rights. America's founders, he argued, recognized civil liberties as essential to the success of democratic selfgovernance. The free-exercise clause in the First Amendment, for example, brought social benefits and was essential to the common good of American society, not just to the private good of individuals. Free exercise of religion protected the freedom of religions to teach morality to their members who, because they could govern their own lives according to conscience, were capable for tasks of national self-governance. In general, Murray always sought to "establish sociality as an initial defining condition even for rights as immunities." 31 Accordingly, he rejected "liberalist individualism" as a foundation for the right to religious liberty. On the contrary, liberalism produced a theory of the person and of knowledge able to serve as a premise for the recrudescence of a monist state inimical to religious liberty. Modern monism, or totalitarianism, was the coercive claim by a state (e.g. the French Third Republic, the Soviet Union, the Third Reich) to supreme, undivided authority over all areas of social existence. Murray, with Pope Leo XIII, saw rationalist individualism as its theoretical and practical starting point. As rationalism it ruled out any truth or value not fully derived from human reason; as individualism it referred to the competence of an individual's rational capacity. In practice, it al-27 See, The Doctoral Dissertation of John Courtney Murray 22-26. 28 33 He interpreted the emergence of Western legal and political protection for religious liberty as a consequence primarily from tradition understood to include the institutionalization, and not only the verbal transmission, of the gospel. And so the original subject of religious liberty was the whole, institutionally organized Church. Assertion and acquisition of its freedom for life and witness was the tree in whose shade people came to see and claim individual religious liberty. Murray disagreed with interpretations of the religious clauses as if they implemented preconceived theoretical concepts already deposited in documents, even the Bible. Instead he held that gradual, progressive formation of Western consciousness and political institutions by church-and-state dualism led the way. The path ran from the missions of Son and Spirit in the advent of the Church to Pope Gelasius's spelling out of church-and-state dualism; from there to medieval principles on the consent of the governed and the rule of law, through the Magna Carta in 1215 and English legal tradition, over to New World colonists' grass-roots appropriation of the rights of an Englishman, up through their resistance to state control of religion, into the founders' legal realism in a pluralist society, and The answer from Augustine to Aquinas had been that the act of faith springs from a love for God that is the first effect of the grace of faith. Augustine said, "It is love that asks; it is love that seeks; it is love that makes one adhere to revelation; and it is love that maintains the adherence once it is given/' 40 Consequently, the faith that justifies "is a loving submission to Christ the Lord {credere Christo) and a movement of the soul that seeks union with Christ {credere in Christum)"* 1 This characterization appealed to the Fourth Gospel's description of believers being drawn by the Father (6:44,65; 8:32). 42 Later, the Council of Orange declared that the initium fidei was a "trustful adherence" {cre-dulitatis affectus) "by which we first enter into communion with God" (Canon). 43 The trusting love, said Augustine and Orange, is "not a product of our natural powers but is a gift of the Holy Spirit at work in our hearts." 44 Aquinas followed suit when he too affirmed a graced love interior to faith. This is not to say that he conducted an analysis simply on the authority of Augustine but to identify his consistency with Augustine.
Aquinas, however, often referred to the role of the will in terms of a "command of [by] the will." In response to the question whether it is meritorious to believe, he wrote that "to believe is an act of mind assenting to the divine truth by virtue of the command of the will as this is moved by God through grace." 45 And so, reasoned Aquinas, faith is a free and therefore meritorious act. Elsewhere he conceived the act of will in faith as an "affection" which "determines" the intellect stating, for example, that "the beginning of faith is in affection insofar as the will determines the intellect to assent to the things of faith." 46 This willing, he clarified, "is not an act of charity nor of hope but is a certain appetite for the good promised." 47 Mohler explained this to mean, "the will is drawn on by the supernatural good, which is God ... in the beatific vision," 48 and so drawn, inclines the mind to assent to things it cannot see because God guarantees their truth. Murray followed Aquinas, though he supported a renewal in patristics, 49 and described the voluntareity of assent to the Word of God in terms other than Aquinas's "command of the will." 50 Emphasis on a voluntary dynamic immanent in the intellectual assent of faith characterized Murray's theology of faith. It was a position that he began to develop as a modification of Scheeben's.
INTERPRETATION: LOVE EXPRESSES FINALITY
In his "Matthias Joseph Scheeben's Doctrine on Supernatural, Divine Faith: A Critical Exposition" (1937), Murray stressed that Aquinas had pointed to the voluntary dynamic in faith. Murray interpreted this to mean that love was an option for, a self-dedication to, God as supreme good and last end. This option moved assent. His concept incorporated Aquinas's principle of final causality: faith fulfills a human tendency toward God {reditus) and not only a reverence due to God as first efficient cause from which all created being has come forth {exitus). Murray caught sight of Aquinas's situating of faith within the exitus I reditus plan. Faith was the beginning of the salvific return of rational creatures to God by way of union with Christ. His focus on finality opened up a point of departure from Scheeben's theology of faith.
In his Dogmatik (1873) Scheeben had expounded a theology of faith in the service of Vatican I's teaching. The act of belief was for him the supreme instance of creaturely obedience to the Creator, whose authority commands that creatures accept divine revelation as true. Faith fulfilled the fundamental moral duty rational creatures owed to the Creator. Earlier, in Nature and Grace (1861), Scheeben had conceived faith along the lines of the Greek Fathers. Murray noted Scheeben's indebtedness to Maximus the Confessor. 51 According to this preVatican I approach, faith participated in the Son's knowledge of the Father. Faith was an anticipatory mode of beatific vision that divinized the created understanding. When Vatican I reemphasized the principle of divine and apostolic authority in the Church and underlined faith as obedience, Scheeben refocused his views. In his post-Vatican I theology, faith did not so much participate in the Son's knowledge of the Father as it shared in the Son's self-sacrifice to the Father. Rev- erent submission to divine authority in an act of faith was a believer's sacrificium intellectus in imitation of Christ's obedience. Scheeben's Dogmatik stressed this partly in opposition to a rival claim. Some learned people claimed to have arrived at a natural faith from rationally evident premises and evidences. This did not involve obedience to the Creator, repentance for sin, or resolution to live in an amended way. Their type of consent to God, Scheeben warned, contained neither reverent submission nor personal commitment to God. Natural faith did not animate a new way of life and was not to be considered equivalent to the supernatural, divine faith professed by the Catholic Church. Affirmation of revealed truth that did not at the same time involve a change in way of life was not the faith of the Gospels. Scheeben countered that, on the contrary, believing with divine, supernatural faith was the devout fulfillment of a universal moral duty toward the Creator that was incumbent on all rational creatures. This obligation pertained to the order of truth no less than to the order of the moral good. Had not Vatican I taught that created reason is absolutely subject to uncreated Truth? In agreement, Scheeben argued that created reason fulfilled the duty toward uncreated Truth in the obedience of faith. This involved, however, a personal surrender to God in accepting divine revelation as true. Love and commitment characterized the act of belief. It was not an intellectual act disconnected from reverence for God and conversion of life.
On the contrary, Scheeben taught, faith synthesized intellectual and volitional acts, integrated mind and heart. Faith fused obedient love for God with assent to God's revelation as true. This went beyond merely underscoring Vatican Fs correlation of divine command (revelation) and creaturely obedience (faith). Scheeben's originality on the point lay in conceiving the command-obedience structure by analogy with parent-child relations. The created reality he used as an analogue to revelation and faith was benevolent paternalism and childlike obedience in family life. The affective dynamic in an act of faith was like the trusting reverence a cherished child had for a beloved parent. The affective dimension of faith was a childlike, trusting reverence for God the Creator {pius credulitatis affectus).
In commanding that revelation be accepted as true on divine authority, God was like a revered parent whose authoritative commands were beneficent and could be so appreciated by the child, though reasons for them might escape the child's understanding. Like a parent directing a child, the Creator placed a demand on all rational creatures crucial to the hearers' good. In the Bible the leading alternative to faith was not reason but ignorance. The Hebrew Scriptures opposed "knowledge of God" to "ignorance of God." This kind of "knowledge" involved a knower's freedom, love, and self-disposition. Such knowing was the full, selfdefining act by the whole person. Murray contrasted this with the usual view by noting that "knowledge of God" was "an affair of the heart, in the biblical sense of the heart as the center and source of the whole inner life in its full complex of thought, desire, and moral decision." 53 The act of faith originated, then, in the human É< heart" whose primal deliberations embraced a "full complex of thought, desire and moral decision." From the heart sprang a life of belief in God which is "knowledge of God" or the refusal known as "ignorance of God." Knowledge or ignorance of God were the two alternatives. Each is formed first of all and characteristically in free, primal, practical selfdefinition, an existential stance. Only then could either become subject matter for theoretical understanding. Despite all the singularities exhibited in Israel's coping with the "problem of God," Murray held that "the Old Testament problematic endures as the permanent religious problematic of all mankind." 54 Israel's particularity disclosed something universally human. Israel's struggle revealed, for example, that the root of faith in God lies in free, practically intelligent selfdedication to God. This moves judgment to accept God's Word as true. His basic principle was that "knowledge of God is not an affair of affirmation [intellectual judgment] alone; it is a free engagement in a whole style of life." 55 This was his position on the voluntary dynamic in faith on the eve of Vatican II.
In analyzing various types of atheism Murray showed that voluntareity was not voluntarism. First, atheism had a voluntary dynamic and an intelligible content. Just as knowledge of God was "free engagement in a whole style of life," so too was its opposite. That is, "ignorance of God is not simply a want of knowledge or even a denial; it too is the free choice of a mode of being." 56 He recalled that "the Bible clearly locates the ultimate root of atheism not in an erroneous judgment of the mind but in an act of choice, made somehow in the name of freedom." 57 The choice was for a godless life. This made the choice an act of selfdefinition. Self-definition involved a somewhat knowable way of life, at least as an inner orientation. The choice was practical and existential but not a contentless option for self-expression. Adhering to a theory of reality was, for Murray, a secondary act dependent on the primary act and content of self-definition.
Second, Murray saw that defining the broadest contours of one's life had to do with recognizing oneself or not. In fact, love for God expressed as formal belief in God was the fundamental human act of self-recognition and self-understanding. Likewise, atheism was a matter of human self-understanding and identity. Unbelief no less than belief involved at its most basic level who one understood oneself to be, as well as whether one thought there were or were not sufficient grounds forjudging one way or the other on the question whether God exists. Murray explained that "the will to atheism, again like the will to faith, issues forth from the deepest regions of the self, where freedom is more than choice [specific choices], where it is the self recognizing its own existence in the recognition of God or rejecting its own existence in the refusal of God." 58 In the drama of human existence, inside or outside Christianity, the voluntary "root" of belief or unbelief was an act of basic self-definition, personal, and possibly also communal. In the case of faith, love for God as last end was expressed in free self-disposition. But it was love for God immanent in affirmation of something true about self and God.
Because of the priority of this act of free self-definition, whether complete and whole in belief or truncated in unbelief, Murray concluded that "atheism is never the conclusion of any theory, philosophical or scientific." Instead, "it is a decision, a free act of choice that antedates all theories." 59 This fundamental act of choice inspired atheistic philosophies rather than flowing from them as a conclusion. That interpretation was, he thought, "derivative from the Bible." 60 The act of choice was pretheoretical, but not apart from known content.
What was the content of the fundamental act of self-definition? The content was not primarily that of specific choices. Belief or unbelief was prior to and immanent in specific choices about particular objects. The priority was one of interiority, not of temporal sequence and more like a relation of cause to effect. But if prior to specific choices such as, for example, how to earn a livelihood, whom to marry, whether to seek further education, then what was the content of self-definition? As Murray pointed out by referring to an "engagement in a whole style of life," the definition outlined the journey of one's life. Self-definition as belief affirmed and accepted both one's own self as creature and the divine source as last end. For Murray belief in God affirmed the teleological structure of human existence.
Murray, it is true, did not cast his position in the vocabulary of "correlation" or "dialogue." Yet in 1962 he treated free, practical affirmation that "I am" and "God is" precisely as the believer's affirmative correlation of teleologically structured human existence and divine reality. Conversely, an option for unbelief rejected a teleological interpretation of human existence. Assent to God in faith involved recognizing and accepting the godward structure of human existence. Ac-58 Ibid. 85. 59 Ibid. 95. 60 Murray points to a pretheoretical self-disposition prior to argument that therefore could be considered a moment in a personal and social narrative. 64 He presupposed resolution of the theoretical question about God's existence into the practical, biblical search for God's presence. But then he reconceived divine presence. Biblical models of divine presence in theophanies or even in Emmanuel, "God-with-us," applied to Christ gave to the search a positive assurance that God was faithful to us amid our trials and sufferings. However, this did not yet say much about human action toward social and political goals. That issue needed to be raised within the human-divine relationship. And so Murray recast the problem of God as a search for divine presence, as an efficacious being-with-us that enables human beings to stand forth in their freedom, to direct their actions and assume their role as shapers of society. So the question with which he closed The Problem of God was: Do God and faith enable people to assume socially constructive and nation-building tasks? If the answer is "yes," God and faith empower people to mobilize their human resources toward the common good in the temporal order. If the answer is "no," God and faith cripple this capacity. Which is it?
Arguing that God and faith were socially and politically constructive would provide a new form of biblical "knowledge of God" as "constitutive of man's historical existence." A negative answer was a new form of biblical "ignorance of God" alleging that divine presence destroys human historical agency. Each alternative was testable by recourse to history for evidence of individual and social action. Which alternative has enabled, which has destroyed, the ability of a person or a society to constitute their "historical existence"? Has acknowledging the presence of God produced the result that "a man may exist, 'stand forth' as a man in freedom and in human action"? Has "knowledge of God" or "ignorance of God" promoted a way of life and action "that alienates man from himself? Has so destructive an effect come from "confession of God's presence in history and in man's consciousness"? Or from "the suppression of [God] from history and the repression of [God] from consciousness"?
Murray's implied answer is obvious from his critique of bourgeois atheism, Marxist communism, and Sartrean existentialism. Of course "knowledge of God" enabled a person or society to "stand forth in freedom and in human action." But raising the question does more than merely elicit that answer. The question surfaces a new contingency in the voluntary dynamic of faith. The contingent element has become the modern, Western appreciation of active responsibility for society and nation, a culturally inflected love for the common temporal good and the tasks proper to its achievement. Murray's question builds a determinate modality into faith or, contrarily, into atheism. His question was about modern faith, its answer pointed to a voluntary dynamic qualified by modernity's recognition of people's active participation in society and state. The love for God that moves faith is love by one who participates in the mores, goals, and values characteristic of a given cultural milieu and historical epoch. Only a love for God as last end who empowers people socially and politically converts, not annihilates, appreciation for the active contribution of every person toward the common temporal good.
The grace of faith affects finality toward God ad modum recipientis. This includes mediation of the finality by other goods people also love.
Love for the Creator of culturally accessible goods undergoes transformation into love for God as last end and beatitude. The Creator can only be known and loved through a surpassing of cultural values and concrete goods. Such evaluations are culturally variable and historically mutable. This shifts the problem of God out of a classicist concept of objective truth and value into historical consciousness of the personal and social subjects who know and love. This means, and it is a discovery based on Murray's theology of faith, that the voluntary dynamic of faith, no less than any formulation of truth, is from the start codetermined by social and cultural particularities. 65 The "root of faith" which is love for God has a contingent aspect drawing on and transforming the created goods appreciated by the believer's culture in a given era.
A conclusion from Murray is that the graced pia affectio referred to by theological tradition realizes itself always in a particular cultural mode which gives faith a historically variable concreteness. Cultural modes speak languages resonant with memories of goods loved and truths known. A culturally inflected love for God ascends from a society's appreciations for concrete goods. When moving the mind to assent to revelation, affection for the Creator is as new as the grace of faith and the arrival of the saving Word. But the newness also renews and transforms, heals and elevates already existent love for goods and truths available to a person in the culture. The will-to-faith is always a culturally inflected love for God that transforms but cannot bypass loves for whatever created goods the culture prizes. Murray's preconciliar fundamental theology yields a significant consequence when understood in light of conciliar anthropology. The Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modern World presents the main conciliar doctrine on the person, but many other documents, especially the Declaration on Religious Liberty, make a contribution. Together these two texts provide an adequate statement of the council's teaching on the human person as imago Dei. 71 The latter can be read in reference to Murray's theology of faith no less than to his social ethics. The result is that the voluntareity of faith can be seen to involve human dignity.
With the Declaration on Religious Liberty the council gave official approval to a theme of modern culture which had been insufficiently appreciated in the Church. The bishops accepted as of God a typically modern consciousness of human dignity that for several hundred years in the West had energized demands for religious liberty and, at least in England and the U.S., for limited, constitutional government. 72 Modern consciousness of the dignity of the person grasped a truth "known through the revealed word of God and by reason itself." 73 The Declaration, together with the Pastoral Constitution, gave new standing to human dignity as a theme in the life and mission of Catholicism, though in substance if not in terminology it had long been a part of the Church's social teaching. At a minimum the two documents clarified the basis for subsequent ecclesial and papal commitment to the human-rights agenda and placed that commitment on common ground with all who struggle for human dignity and human rights. Moreover, the affirmation of human dignity illuminated other doctrines, so that the processes of renewal transmit that affirmation in many pastoral accents, from respect for the mission and role of the laity to liturgical renewal in the direction of active participation and social ministries promoting human rights. The argument is that the council's commitment to human dignity has a profound effect on the contingent element in love for God that moves faith. The council initiated a renewal in the very act of believing as well as refined elements in the content believed. 74 This occurred because conciliar orientation to human dignity modifies the meaning of the creaturely love for God internal to faith.
The key to conciliar teaching on the Creator-creature relationship and the dignity of the human creature is the theme of the imago Dei. Anthony Erhueh does not hesitate to say that the u imago Dei is the basis and foundation of human dignity" in the Pastoral Constitution. 75 Its first chapter presents God as the Creator whose imago are the socially related persons whose dignity is spelled out in some of its main elements by the chapter. The Declaration on Religious Liberty grounds religious liberty in that dignity. While the imago Dei motif is undoubtedly the key to the anthropology of the Pastoral Constitution, its coherence has been under review. Discussion turns on the difference between a creation-centered and a christocentric account of humanity 79 His uneasiness about certain emphases in the Church's teaching may nonetheless highlight the need for further thought and synthesis. But his exposition has not argued conclusively either that there is conflict between nos. 12 and 22 in the Pastoral Constitution or that the difference has generated division in postconciliar American Catholicism. That a difference in textual foci might express a real though unformulated unity receives no consideration. Yet why cannot those two sections witness to a faith-understanding whose comprehensive unity is real (both are scriptural) but which may elude conceptual synthesis in this (or any) text? The unity immanent in the multitude of deeds and words in divine salvation and revelation is real, but that is not the same as saying that the Church's theological understanding of it at any given time (or ever) will be more than a deepening grasp of a whole which remains an asymptotic goal for theology. The whole has not yet been historically realized either.
Therefore the assumption will be made here that the council does not teach a divided and divisive anthropology in the Pastoral Constitution nor, in conjunction with it, in the Declaration on Religious Liberty. from respect for our common humanity that has eyes open to its dignity as imago Dei.
As a result, faith after Vatican II, more than faith after Vatican I. has become a performed participation in the truth of human dignity. 8 This is why the spiritual life of faith has an ecclesiastically mediated impetus toward personal appropriation of the imago Dei. The grace of faith, we are reminded by Murray's fundamental theology, evokes a love for the Creator as last end that simultaneously is an act of human self-recognition and personal dedication to God. The pilgrimage of faith, consequently, brings a gradual, faith-inspired appropriation of a believer's own participation in the imago Dei precisely as a concomitant to deepening faith. 87 The grace of faith blesses the creational conferral of (limited) authority for personal self-direction. Within the renewal of habitual faith under the renewing impulse of the council there takes place a loving obedience to the Creator as first cause and last end in hearing the creational word of God pronounced in the language of the teleological structure and intrinsic dignity of the human person.
If my hypothesis on Vatican II and faith is sound, one can conclude that the work of the Holy Spirit in conciliar renewal produces an unofficial, often inconspicuous, but personal appropriation of human dignity within the dynamic of habitual Catholic faith. This result, which may appear as consciousness of moral agency, stems not primarily from compliance with the valuable external teaching of the magisteriurn on the importance of human dignity, nor from adherence to liberal ideology, but from creaturely acceptance of the inner word on human dignity in the voluntareity of faith itself. The immanence of that word in ordinary faith is a reason for saying that Catholic faith is inseparable from the Church's commitment to fostering the realization of human dignity through respect for human rights. According to this view, then, the Church's postconciliar commitment to the humanrights agenda springs from a graced love for the Creator, educated into new appreciation for the imago Dei, moving the assent of faith. 
